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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Paragraph (b) was added to Section 405 and provides that every motor
carrier is prohibited from interchanging, receiving or delivering with, from, or to
any common carrier which does not have a certificate authorizing it to transport
property within the jurisdiction of the Act. 7 The same Act adds a proviso to
Section 915 to the effect that all motor carriers of passengers whose current liquid
assets do not exceed their current liabilities by $100,000 must cover each vehicle
with a public liability policy in such amounts as the Commission may prescribe,
but not less than a five and ten thousand dollar policy. It also adds a new Section to Article IX (Section 922)8 which requires the Department of Revenue to
cooperate in the issuance of registration plates for commercial vehicles which will
identify those operating under Commission certificates, without the need of separate identification plates; and a new Section to Article XIII (1315)9 fixing penalties for violations by officers, agents, employes, shippers, or consignees of any
provisions of the Act relating to motor carriers.
F. E. READER*

XI.

RESTITUTION

The Act of June 24, 1937,1 made the property of an indigent person liable
for the expenses of his support and burial incurred by any public body whether
such property was owned "at" the time the 'expenses were incurred or "acquired
thereafter." The Act of June 9, 1939,2 amends the former Act and provides
for such liability only "if such property was owned during the time the expenses
were incurred or if the right to ownership of such property existed or was acquired
during the time such expenses were incurred."
The Act of 1937 made a judgment for moneys so expended a lien upon the
real estate of the indigent person and made it collectible as other judgments.
The Act of 1939 provides that the home of the indigent person shall not
be subject to execution "during the lifetime of the indigent person, surviving
spouse, or dependent children."
In Waiis' Estate,"' it is said:
"From the general tenor and purpose of this legislation, it is clear
that there was an implied obligation on the part of the beneficiary to
repay the state for its assistance, if, and when, he was in a position to
7

Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 636, 66 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)
866 PURD. STATS, (Pa.) § 1362.
966 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 1505.
*Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
JP. L. 2045.
2P. L. 310, 62 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 1974.
3336 Pa. 151, 7 A. (2d) 329, decided July 3, 1939.
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do so, and that this obligation should constitute a claim upon the
cstate of a deceased beneficiary. There wai no need to incorporate
this condition in the statute, for at common law there is an implied
duty on the part of a recipient of public assistance, or his estate, to
make reimbursement."
and'
"Therefore it seems to us that although the Act of 1934 made no
express provision for reimbursement, there was an implied condition
attached to every payment of assistance funds, that the recipient would
repay the Commonwealth when able to do so, and that his estate
should be subject to the same liability. Whether the obligation be
regarded as contractual or quasi-contractual, it was nevertheless inherent in the acceptance of state aid. It is apparent that the provision
of Section 15 of the Act of 1936 is merely declaratory of'the existing
law, creating no new obligation and conferring no additional right or
rcmedy upon the Commonwealth which it did not already possess."
When the Act of 1939 was enacted, less than a month before this decision
of the Supreme Court, it must have been supposed by the Legislature that the right
to recover expenses incurred was dependent upon the existence of a statute creating
the right. !tnow makes the statutory right dependent upon the ownership of
property while the expenses are being incurred. If one rejects a tendered assistance paymcnt the day before he inherits a fortune, he may keep the fortune without liability for past assistance, so far as the statute is concerned. But since it is now
held that a common law liability exists aside from the statute, and since the statute
does not say that there shall be no liability unless assistance was accepted while
one had property, it may be that the Act of 1939 will not serve to end such liability.
It does definitely stay execution on the "home and furnishings" of indigent persons, regardless of what other property the defendant in the judgment may have
acquired subsequent to receiving assistance.
It had been held 4a that liability to repay what one had received as old age
assistance did not exist under the Act of January 18, 1834,6 but that it was first
created by the Act of June 25, 1936.6 This was the view taken by the lower
court in Waits' Estate. The Legislature appears to have had the same notion.
JOSEPH
41d., 336 Pa. at 157, 7 A, (2d) at 332.
4
aCommonwealth v. Breidinger, 26 North. 397 (1938).
SP. L. 282.
6P. L. 28.
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